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Abstract 
 
 
In the January 1998 Psychological Review, Vicente and Wang propose a "constraint 
attunement hypothesis" to explain the large effects of domain expertise upon memory 
recall observed in a number of task domains.  They claim to find serious defects in 
alternative explanations of these effects which their theory overcomes. Re-examination of 
the evidence shows that their theory is not novel, but has been anticipated by those they 
criticize, and that other current published theories of the phenomena do not have the 
defects Vicente and Wang attribute to them.  Vicente and Wang's views reflect underlying 
differences (a) about emphasis upon performance versus process in psychology, and (b)  
about how theories and empirical knowledge interact and progress with the development 
of a science. 
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 In the January 1998 Psychological Review, Vicente and Wang (henceforth, V-W) employed an 
ecological approach to explain the "significant correlation between domain expertise and memory recall 
performance after a very brief exposure time" (p. 33).  They claim that "this constraint attunement 
hypothesis [henceforth, CAH] . . . predicts . . . a memory expertise advantage in cases in which experts are 
attuned to the goal-relevant constraints in the material to be recalled and that the more constraint available, 
the greater the expertise advantage can be" (p. 33), and explains "several findings in the literature [that] 
have no satisfactory theoretical explanation."  We will claim that, on the contrary, these findings have 
already been explained by process theories, and the memory advantage has long been understood in terms 
of its goal relevance. 
 After summarizing V-W's theoretical proposal, we address several errors in their account of past 
and current research on expertise.  We then show why the ten experiments V-W review do not support CAH 
unless one adds to it a number of auxiliary assumptions, and why they provide better support for the 
contemporary process theories criticized by V-W.  Process theories need not wait, and have not waited for 
product theories such as CAH to clear the way for progress. 
 
 
0.  Introduction to CAH 
 The authors define CAH very briefly:   
There can be expertise effects [in memory recall] when there are goal-relevant constraints (i.e., 
relationships pertinent to the domain) that experts can exploit to structure the stimuli.  The more 
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constraint available, the greater the expertise advantage can be.  Fully random stimuli have no 
constraints, so no expertise advantage would be expected.  To realize these potential advantages, 
experts must be attuned (i.e., they must attend) to the goal-relevant constraints in question.  [If 
not,] then no expertise advantage is expected. (V-W, p. 36)  
 Thus, CAH asserts that goal-relevant patterns in the task situation, and only such patterns, must 
be attended to.  Nowhere does CAH specify when, within the limitations of learning rates and memory 
capacities, the potential advantage of experts will or won't actually be realized. 
 
 The authors disclaim novelty for CAH, which they describe as deriving from E. J. Gibson's (1969) 
specificity theory and Rasmussen's (1985) notion of abstraction hierarchy; but they claim that its 
application to explain expertise effects in memory recall is novel. 
 
 In terms of goal-relevant constraints, V-W distinguish between "domains in which memorizing 
stimuli is an intrinsic task (i.e., . . .  a definitive feature of that domain . . .) . . . [and domains] in which [it] 
is a contrived task (i.e., . . . not part of that domain of expertise)" (p. 34).  V-W classify reproduction of 
briefly viewed chess boards as a contrived task, unlike most other tasks where superiority of expert memory 
has been demonstrated, quoting Gobet's statement (1994, p. 45) that "Chess players' main occupation is not 
to perform recall experiments but to play chess."  They then claim (pp. 34-35) that "skilled-memory theory, 
LTWM theory, and EPAM IV theory cannot provide an adequate theoretical explanation for expertise 
effects in memory recall for . . . domains in which memory recall is a contrived task,"  and generalize this to 
claim that "an adequate process theory of expertise effects in memory recall has remained elusive."  We will 
refute this claim for chess, the principal "contrived task" they examine, and show the problems that CAH 
faces in dealing with the other tasks they discuss. 
 V-W seek to use well-known experiments to show the superiority of their informal and non-
quantitative CAH over other proposed explanations of the phenomena: the 1946-1973 "chunking" theories 
of de Groot, Jongman, Barenfeld, Chase, Gilmartin and Simon (CHNK); the skilled-memory theory (Chase 
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& Ericsson, 1981, 1982; Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989); the long-term working memory (LTWM)  theory of 
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995); and the EPAM-based template theory (EPAM-TEMP) of Gobet, Richman, 
Simon and Staszewski.  Skilled-memory theory and LTWM, like CAH, are (mainly) non-quantitative;  
EPAM-TEMP, and to a lesser extent CHNK, are embodied in computer simulation models that make 
quantitative predictions.  We will deal first with V-W's specific claims and criticisms, and then with broader 
methodological issues.  
 
1. Data and Theories of Chess Memory 
 Theories and data in science generally undergo progressive growth and refinement, unless the 
theories are discarded in favor of better theories, or the data rejected because of evidence of inaccuracy.  
Treating each theory as a separate entity, V-W misread the cumulative development of knowledge of chess 
memory as a series of failures, reversed only by the appearance of CAH.  A brief review of the actual 
history reveals the errors in their critique of the theories proposed prior to CAH.1 
 
1.1.  The Work of de Groot and its Ramifications 
 De Groot, in his landmark work (in Dutch, 1946), reported that chessmasters could recall a 
chessboard almost perfectly after seeing a game position for a few seconds, while weaker players could 
replace only about half the pieces correctly.  Two decades later it was shown2 that most of the expert's 
advantage vanished if the players viewed the same pieces arranged randomly3  (Jongman, 1968, p. 57, fn. 1;  
Chase & Simon, 1973a, 1973b).   
                                                 
1We will trace only one strand of the history, and that incompletely.  Many important contributors to our 
knowledge of chess memory, for example, Holding and Saariluoma, are almost absent from our account, as 
is research on chess play, as distinct from memory. 
2Unpublished study by Lemmens and Jongman, footnoted in Jongman's thesis. 
3V-W note that these positions are not "truly" random,  for the sets of pieces are taken from game positions, 
and they propose an alternative definition.  In the chess literature, "random" explicitly  and correctly means 
"pieces from game positions rearranged randomly."  We follow this standard usage and discuss the issue of 
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 These findings have been replicated frequently (and analogous findings reported for many other 
tasks): that (1) experts remember much more about chess positions, on brief exposure, than novices; but (2) 
their advantage decreases as the positions deviate from positions typically encountered in games, and 
(nearly) disappears when the pieces from game positions are re-arranged randomly. The "nearly" was only 
established reliably about 1996 (Gobet & Simon, 1996b) by a new experiment and meta-analysis. Until 
then, only two studies (Gold & Opwis, 1992; Saariluoma, 1994), showed statistically significant differences 
between experts and novices in the random condition. 
 These findings concern not just what expert chessplayers are attuned to, which is CAH's sole 
concern as a product theory, but what they learn, know and can recall after exposure that is too brief for 
fixation in LTM.  Therefore they have important implications for the structure of LTM and STM, and for 
the processing times required to store new information.  CAH has no basis for making differential 
predictions for long and short stimulus presentations; therefore it cannot predict masters' difficulty in 
remembering random boards after short exposure without process assumptions (not present in CAH) about 
acquisition, storage processes and size limits on storage and retrieval systems.   De Groot explained the 
findings by the familiarity of chessmasters with patterns that appear frequently in games.  Unlike weaker 
players, masters did not have to retain individual pieces in STM, but only labels for about a half dozen 
meaningful patterns.   Jongman (1968, p. 48) compared these patterns to the "perceptual chunks" of Miller 
(1956).  Chunking was also used by Feigenbaum (1961) in the EPAM theory of LTM and STM.  
 The chunking theory was extended by Simon and Barenfeld (1969), by simulating, with 
PERCEIVER, how knowledge of chess-relevant relations among pieces can guide chessplayers' eye 
movements to recognize meaningful LTM chunks.  The chess-relevance of the relations guiding the eye 
movements and chunking demonstrates that the chunking theory, contrary to V-W’s assertion (p. 35), took 
account of both the meaning of materials and their familiarity (Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984; Simon & 
                                                                                                                                                 
residual pattern, quite comparable to the "non-randomness" of cards dealt in a particular hand.  Lemmens 
and Jongman had already examined four degrees of randomization, V-W's is a fifth.  
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Feigenbaum, 1964).  Meaningfulness influenced attention, hence learning; familiarity permitted subsequent 
recognition (Simon & Barenfeld, 1969, p. 481).  
 But de Groot, in 1946, had already recognized the relevance of chunks (his "complexes") for 
understanding chess positions:  "The position is perceived in large complexes, each of which hangs 
together. . . . [and]  . . . is to be considered as a unit of perception and  significance.  (de Groot, [1946] 
1978, pp. 329-30).  Here we see, a half century prior to V-W's paper, a key aspect of the CAH theory 
clearly stated and used, explaining chunks as acquired for one purpose, but used for another.  CAH only 
predicts a possible connection between task-relevant knowledge and task performance, while de Groot 
provides also learning and recognition processes  to account for performance in two distinct tasks.  The 
chunks were learned and stored as part of the "intrinsic" task of playing skillfully, but, once stored, prove 
useful in the "contrived" task of recalling positions.   
 Today, CHREST (De Groot and Gobet, 1996; Gobet, 1993; Gobet & Simon, in press), a template 
theory used to simulate chess memory experiments, acquires chunks by scanning a database of games. The 
CHUMP model (Gobet & Jansen, 1994), using the same input, plays chess by growing a discrimination net 
for moves and learning to associate these moves with the patterns acquired by its CHREST component.4  
Thus, the model embodies the "theory of expertise in domain-relevant problems, not just expertise effects in 
memory recall," that V-W (p. 48) call for.   
 
 1.2. The C-S Experiments and Theory 
 In the 1970s, Chase and Simon (1973a, 1973b) began to explore the CHNK hypothesis more 
directly:  
                                                 
4CHUMP plays weak chess because no search mechanisms are implemented, although they are part of the 
chunking and template theories (Chase & Simon, 1973b, pp. 269-270, Gobet, 1997, Gobet & Simon, 
1998b). 
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Previous studies . . . make highly plausible . . . that the chess master encodes information . . . in 
chunks but provide no direct methods for delimiting the chunk boundaries or detecting the 
relations . . . among the components of a chunk  [italics added].  Evidence is needed . . . to 
discover how many pieces typically constitute a chunk, . . . the relative sizes . . . of the chunks of 
masters and weaker players, and how many chunks players retain after a brief view of a position. . . 
. The central objective of this study, then, is to isolate and define the chunks . . . in chess 
perception tasks (1973a, pp. 56-57). 
 C-S then use this definition to segment the chunks in the board recall task.  Thus, the main goal of 
the C-S experiment was not, contrary to V-W, to "test" the chunking hypothesis, but to provide new 
observational means for characterizing chunks.  While adding new evidence for the large master-novice 
difference in the recall of game positions, the experiment did not detect a difference in random positions.  It 
did detect (C-S, 1973a, p. 70 and Tables 3 and 7; 1973b, p. 232) that the chunks in random positions, as in 
game positions, had more than an average number of chess relations among their pieces, which should, 
according to theory, produce increase in recall with skill — but didn't in this experiment.5  
 C-S designed two converging definitions of chunks: latencies between placement of successive 
pieces, and number of chess-relevant relations between such pieces.  (See C-S, 1973a, Figure 5 and 
associated text).6  With these measures, they could now ask whether experts' superiority derives from 
recalling larger chunks or more chunks.  In fact, their chessmaster recalled "both more chunks and larger 
chunks" than the other players, while the theory predicted no differences in number.  In 1973a and 1973b, 
C-S suggested possible explanations for the observed variation in number of chunks, but left the question 
for further study.  
                                                 
5In another experiment, C-S detected large differences between stronger and weaker players in recalling 
random sequences of legal moves, a finding we will discuss later. 
6The convergence of the two methods has recently been replicated and extended by Gobet and Simon 
(1998a). 
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   C-S mention another failure of the original model to explain all  the empirical findings:  recall 
again showed great superiority of stronger players on game positions, but no superiority on random 
positions.  However, C-S also found that, "in the randomized boards, players are noticing the same 
kinds of structures as those they perceive in the coherent positions, even though these structures occur 
rarely in the randomized boards" (1973b, p. 232).  
 Hence, contrary to V-W's claim, the theory  predicted that the strongest player should have shown 
some small superiority even on randomized boards, but the data did not support the prediction, nor, of 
course, the identical prediction that CAH makes.   
 At this same time, the processes of the CHNK theories were simulated by MAPP, a simplified 
version of EPAM (Simon & Gilmartin, 1973).  The chunks learned by MAPP produced a level of recall 
consistent with theoretical estimates of the required number of chess patterns (and also consistent with 
Gobet & Simon, 1996a).  The simulation found  "substantial correlations between chess master and 
MAPP as to which pieces . . . are remembered, . . . the organization of these pieces in chunks, and . . . 
the sequence in which pieces are replaced on the board" (p. 46).   
None of these findings are predicted by CAH. Both experimental findings and the results of simulation 
supported the CHNK theory, as implemented in PERCEIVER and MAPP,  
to account for the main [italics added] features of the human performances . . . by bringing 
together . . . basic mechanisms, for chunking in short-term and long-term memory and for 
managing attention,7 whose significance had already been demonstrated . . . in experimental 
paradigms and tasks quite remote from the present one (Simon and Gilmartin, 1973, p. 46).   
 Although explicitly recognizing that the theory did not explain the observed lack of expert 
superiority on random boards or the increase in number of chunks with expertise, C-S took the usual and 
                                                 
7Notice the role of the attention mechanism in EPAM, again anticipating CAH. 
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justified position that failure to account for all  known phenomena is not grounds for rejecting a theory's 
core, but an invitation to explain the deviation (Lakatos, 1970).   
1.3. Charness (1976) 
 Charness (1976) found an even more serious gap in CHNK as a complete theory.  Intervening tasks 
that use STM should interfere with ability to reproduce positions after the interruption (as in the Peterson 
and Peterson, 1959, paradigm), but they did not. (CAH would not, of course, account for the effects of 
intervening tasks.)   
 Where were the chunks or the pointers held while the intervening task was being performed?  
Simon (1976), citing independent evidence from verbal learning, proposed that a chunk could be inserted in 
an existing LTM node in 1 s or 2 s.  This new hypothesis would account for Charness's results. 
  Charness's anomaly led to experiments with two mnemonicists who learned (after two years of 
almost daily training) to memorize, in one trial, lists of 80 or more digits presented at one digit per second 
— far too rapidly, according to the original EPAM theory, to transfer them to LTM.  Chase and Ericsson 
(1981) and Staszewski (1988) showed that the participants gradually learned new LTM schemas that they 
called "retrieval structures": deliberately acquired discrimination nets containing "slots" for variables that 
could be filled within 1 s or less each.  The evidence for their existence and use was extensive, permitting 
quantitative prediction of learning rates over the entire learning period (Richman, Staszewski & Simon, 
1995).   
 
1.4. Recent Developments of Chunking Theory 
 Subsequently, CHNK has evolved on two complementary lines.  First, the skilled-memory theory 
(Chase & Ericsson, 1982; Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989) and LTWM (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) use 
retrieval structures to explain expert recall in various domains.  Second, the direct descendant of CHNK, 
EPAM-TEMP ("EPAM with templates"), comprises both EPAM-IV (Richman, Staszewski & Simon, 1995) 
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and CHREST, the latter with schemas specialized for chess.8  These simulations predict both outcomes, and 
processes.  In its account of the sources of the expert's knowledge, and its use of the attention mechanism, 
EPAM-TEMP again anticipates the much weaker CAH product theory.   
 In chess, most templates and other patterns in LTM are acquired while studying games and books 
in order that common patterns will be recognized, giving access to information relevant for choosing 
strategies and moves.  For skilled chess play, a store of recognizable patterns and associated chess 
information is indispensable.  It is also invaluable, if inadvertently, for performing the recall task.  The 
EPAM-TEMP theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1998a, in press), incorporating this feature, 
experiences none of the difficulties that V-W attribute to process theories of recall when performing 
"contrived" tasks.  Information, learned for whatever purpose, can be evoked and used for a new task.  
 
1.5. EPAM-TEMP 
 EPAM learns both to discriminate and recognize familiar stimuli.  The information at the various 
terminal nodes (semantic memory) is connected by associations (see Richman, Simon & Staszewski, 1995).  
EPAM-TEMP retains these same mechanisms, adding retrieval structures and templates, learned in the 
ordinary way, whose form may depend on the task to be addressed.   
 For example, in recalling digit strings, the retrieval structures were abstract hierarchies (Richman, 
Simon & Staszewski, 1995), explicitly memorized and associated with pre-existing semantic schemas 
through the standard EPAM learning mechanisms, with unchanged learning parameters.  Their novelty was 
ability to insert digits in an already-learned hierarchy about as rapidly as it could insert them in STM.    
                                                 
8In both skilled-memory theory and EPAM-TEMP, "retrieval structure" refers to an LTM structure 
deliberately acquired.  The other memory structures, which also have variable slots, are called "templates."  
Templates need not be deliberately acquired and fully available to consciousness,  but are available  to 
recall when the task calls attention to them.  Occasionally, when mode of acquisition and awareness are not 
at issue, we use “retrieval structure” in a generic sense, including both “template” and “retrieval structure” 
in the narrower meaning defined here. 
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 CHREST incorporates templates with slots for squares, which can accept information about the 
piece on each square or a familiar chunk of pieces located around it.  The largest templates (often 
containing a dozen or more pieces) correspond mainly to typical opening positions.  These templates 
represent no essential novelty.  The rapid LTM encoding they allow explains why interference has little 
effect in Charness' (1976) and Frey and Adesman's (1976) experiments, but do not otherwise much alter the 
earlier chunking theories.  Templates are created automatically during learning, reflecting the patterns in the 
environment (Gobet & Simon, 1998a, in press), thus achieving one of V-W's goals for future research.  
 CHREST, using Web-stored data bases of chess games, has grown a discrimination net of 300,000 
nodes.  Performance in the recall task improves steadily with size of net, and approaches master level 
performance: 85% versus 90% (Gobet, 1998; Gobet & Simon, in press).  This removes V-W's objection (p. 
34) that CHREST did not simulate master-level recall performance.  (Simulating any performance is beyond 
the power of CAH.)  
  Hence, far from refuting the CHNK theory or the EPAM theory, the experimental results of 
Charness and Chase-Ericsson-Staszewski showed how to amend the theory by incorporating variable slots 
in LTM schemas.  The contemporary versions of the chunking hypothesis embodied in EPAM and 
CHREST account for all of the phenomena that caused trouble for C-S and their successors with the earlier 
CHNK simulations.  Wherever CAH makes predictions at all, the new chunking models make good 
quantitative predictions, whereas CAH predicts only differences of sign. 
 
2.  The evidence reviewed by V-W 
 We will next comment on the specific experiments that V-W cite as supporting CAH or refuting 
competing theories.  Because these experiments are described by V-W, and the original papers are available 
in the literature, we can be very brief.  They encompass both chess and other tasks. 
2.1.  Chase and Simon (1973b) 
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 Participants reconstructed move sequences from master games:  actual moves, or random but legal 
moves, dictated at 5 s a move.  All participants did much better with actual than with random move 
sequences; and the stronger players much better than the weaker with actual moves.  But contrary to the 
experimenters' reported expectations, performance with random legal moves also varied strongly with the 
strength of the player.  
 V-W regard these findings as refuting the chunking theory, but they only refute the incautious 
prediction of the experimenters, who did not use MAPP to check their guess (illustrating the frequent 
superiority in reasoning from precise models rather than words).  The positions were set up by the 
participants and studied for 30 s before the moves were presented.  Then, the players had 5 s to study each 
move on the slowly changing board: long enough to fixate at least half the moves, at the usual 8 s per chunk.  
Even in the random-move condition, numerous chess-relevant patterns were visible so that all chunking 
theories would predict expert superiority.  CAH, which does not deal with processes, much less their 
durations, cannot predict the outcome at all without making additional ad hoc assumptions about the 
"constraints" that distinguish this from the ordinary board recall task.   
 
2.2. Frey and Adesman (1976) 
 In this experiment an interposed task (a second chess position) interfered only minimally with 
recall of the board.  This is predicted by the EPAM-TEMP version of the chunking theory.  
 Frey and Adesman also compared game positions, random placement, and move-by-move 
presentation of the preceding moves in the usual board replacement paradigm.  For the first two conditions, 
as usual, stronger players showed a clear advantage in game but not random positions.  The three groups, 
but especially the strongest players, did still better with move-by-move presentation.   
 V-W claim the improvement in the latter condition is predicted by CAH, because the presentation 
provides "redundant information about the tactics and strategies that led to the position to be recalled" (p. 
40), hence an extra "constraint."  EPAM-TEMP would obviously also show the expert advantage, for many 
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positions are reached by common sequences of opening moves, and this information would be retrieved and 
used in recall.  Moreover, in the move-by-move condition, S's had considerable time for fixation, as the 
position changed only one piece at a time.  Hence, the chunking hypothesis makes the same prediction in 
this case as CAH, but can be quantified, as the latter cannot.9   
 
2.3. Goldin (1978)  
 As V-W admit (p. 45), the results from Goldin's 1978 experiment "contradict CAH."  The results 
do not conflict with chunking theories in either CHNK or EPAM-TEMP form, although assumptions would 
have to be made about costs of errors of omission and commission to predict outcome. (See section on 
Myles-Worsley et al., 1988, experiment, below.)  
 
2.4. Lane and Robertson (1979) 
 In this study of recall of chessboards, in the "semantic task" condition, participants decided which 
player had the advantage and chose the best move;  in the "formal" condition, participants counted the 
numbers of pieces on the black and the white squares.  All participants also memorized another position 
("intentional" learning condition).   
 Recall was better in the "semantic" than in the "formal" condition, and equally good in the 
"semantic" and "intentional learning" conditions.  CAH predicts this, as does the chunking theory on the 
basis of difference in focus of attention.  
 
2.5. Reynolds (1982) 
 This is a study of recall of positions constructed randomly, but under certain constraints ("order of 
grouping").  V-W note that "the only statistically significant effect of expertise occurs in the condition with 
                                                 
9In the EPAM-TEMP theory, redundancy plays two facilitating roles:  it reduces the rate of forgetting in 
LTM, and it provides alternative retrieval paths for stored information.  See Richman, Staszewski and 
Simon (1995). 
May 19, 2007  15 
the highest order grouping" (p. 41).10  The same result would be predicted by any form of CHNK or 
EPAM. 
 
2.6. Barfield (1986)   
 In this experiment, computer codes instead of chessboards are recalled:  intact code, the same code 
with sub-blocs arranged randomly, or the same code with lines arranged randomly.  The chunking theory in 
any of its forms predicts better recall at all levels of expertise, and increasing advantage of more expert 
players with more coherence.  CAH makes the same prediction. 
 
2.7. Coughlin and Patel (1987) 
 In this experiment, medical students and physicians recall sets of symptoms.  The order of 
appearance of symptoms is relevant, or irrelevant.  The symptoms were presented in that order, or 
randomly.  In the random condition, physicians performed significantly better than students when order of 
symptoms was irrelevant but not when it was relevant.  As relevance is a condition for attention, hence for 
learning in the chunking theory, all chunking theories predict this result.  There is no need to heed or encode 
irrelevant information, hence its removal from the set of symptoms will not affect recall. 
 
2.8. Myles-Worsley et al. (1988) 
 This experiment compared the ability of participants at various levels of expertise to distinguish 
abnormal (presumably pathological) X-rays from normal X-rays.  With greater expertise, more abnormal X-
rays were recognized as such, but more normal X-rays were also judged abnormal.   
 The chunking model would predict that experts would detect subtler conditions of possible 
abnormality than would less expert judges.  Without specifying participants' beliefs about the costs of errors 
                                                 
10
 Figure 5 of V-W is incorrectly labeled. The skill levels used by Reynolds (1982) were Class C, Class A 
and Masters, not Class C, Class B and Class A. 
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of omission and commission, chunking cannot predict (nor can CAH) how experts' capabilities for 
recognizing symptoms would bias their decisions in borderline cases. 
   
2.9. Vicente (1992) 
 Experts and novices were shown the behavior of a simulated thermal-hydraulic process plant and 
asked to recall the final state of the process variables and to diagnose whether the trial was "normal," 
"faulty" (one fault introduced into the operation), or "random" (the process variables driven in a physically 
meaningless fashion).  CAH makes the correct prediction[,] of expert superiority in all three conditions, and 
of descending accuracy from "normal" through "faulty" to "random."  Again, V-W need an ad hoc 
assumption about relevance to support the predictions.  
 The chunking model would learn patterns (chunks) of process variables in each of the conditions 
and expand its EPAM net to discriminate among the three conditions.  If we equate randomness in chess 
boards with "abnormality" in a machine, then a chunking theory would predict that experts (a) would 
recognize degrees of departure from normality, and (b) would remember more of the properties (familiar 
chunks) of "normal" configurations.   
 
2.10. Gobet and Simon (1994, 1996b, 1998a) 
 The absence of expert-novice differences in recalling random positions had long been questioned 
by the CHNK theorists, because their theories predicted at least small differences.  A meta-analysis of 13 
studies (Gobet & Simon, 1996b) showed a small but statistically significant superiority of experts over 
novices on random boards, confirming the suspicions roused by the C-S prediction and revived by V-W. 
 Gobet and Simon (1998a) also examined the question, first raised by C-S (1973a, 1973b), of 
whether the difference in number of chunks recalled by experts and novices was a reality or an artifact.  In 
particular, "as the subjects used actual chess boards and pieces, the maximum number of pieces they could 
grasp in one hand could have limited apparent chunk sizes" (Gobet & Simon, 1998a, p. 226).   
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 New experiments, using the mouse to replace pieces on a computer screen, show that chunk sizes 
had been substantially underestimated, so that size, rather than number, is the principal basis for the 
superior recall of stronger players.  The new data replicated the original findings of negative correlation 
between placement times and numbers of chess relations between successively placed pieces, and the 
superiority of strong over weak players in recall.11  They also gave a good fit to the visual STM capacity 
parameter originally estimated from printed characters (Zhang & Simon, 1985). 
 
2.11.  A Proposed Experiment  
 V-W (p. 45) propose an experiment that would lead to different predictions by CAH from those of 
EPAM-TEMP theory.  "Truly" random positions ("random2") would be constructed by randomizing both 
the pieces selected and their location, not just the location, as in the standard ("random1") procedure.  V-W 
state that CAH predicts no difference in recall in random2 across skill levels, while EPAM-TEMP (or any 
chunking theory) would predict a skill effect, for stronger players will more often than weaker players 
recognize the patterns produced adventitiously by the random process (just as a random bridge deal 
occasionally produces 13 spades in one hand).   
 Data recently collected by Gobet and Waters (in preparation)  including 36 participants, from 
amateurs to grandmasters, show that stronger players recall random2 positions better than weaker players.  
V-W might now argue that random2 sets are really not random, because there are still constraints (e.g., a 
square can only be occupied by one piece).  However, this defense underlines the ad hoc way in which CAH 
defines and can redefine the "constraints of a domain."  In any event, the predictions of the chunking 
theories, but not of CAH, are supported by the observed data.   
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 There was a clear difference, by expertise, in the random positions, as both the chunking theory and, 
more recently, CAH predict, thus removing one experimental (not theoretical) anomaly that C-S had noted 
25 years earlier. 
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2.12.  Empirical Evidence: Conclusions 
 At the heart of CAH is the idea that in acquiring expertise, attention is paid to information relevant 
to expert performance, and only such information.  This idea was announced by de Groot in 1946 and 
elaborated by the subsequent research.  It remains embedded in the chunking models in their current 
LTWM and EPAM-TEMP forms.  Process models do not ignore the goal-oriented and adaptive nature of 
behavior, for they fully incorporate adaptive mechanisms (e.g., goals, means-ends analysis). In addition, 
contrary to V-W’s claim (p. 36), (itself contradicted by the citation of De Groot (1966) in their appendix [p. 
56]), proponents of chunking processes have made detailed analyses of the constraints offered by the 
statistical properties of the chess environment (Chase & Simon, 1973a, b, De Groot, 1966; De Groot & 
Gobet, 1996; Jongman, 1968; Simon & Gilmartin, 1973), thereby adding to the quantitative strength of the 
theory. 
 The experiments cited by V-W show no superiority of CAH over CHNK and EPAM-TEMP.  The 
chunking theories make many predictions about process as well as product, hence explain, as CAH cannot, 
how the outcomes come about.  Moreover, CAH makes only qualitative predictions; and even for these, 
constraints must be constructed and rationalized ad hoc for each task. 
 In contrast, the chunking theory makes many quantitative predictions, using parameters that are 
constant over all the tasks.  For example, in all EPAM simulations, 8 s are required to store a single chunk 
in LTM unless slotted templates are accessed, but these require about 1/4 s each.  Converging evidence has 
produced information about the sizes and nature of chunks and templates.  In CHREST, adapted specifically 
to chess, normal human study materials (e.g., tournament games) are used for learning the discrimination 
net with its chunks and templates.   
 
3. Phenomena and Theories 
 V-W's approach, focused on testing theories by generating observations that may disconfirm them, 
takes an unproductive view of the relation between phenomena and theories, and fails to explain where 
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theories come from.  In the actual practice of science (Gooding, 1990; Hanson, 1961; Simon, 1977; 
Thaggard, 1988), a major motivation for experimentation is to discover and characterize new phenomena.  
Oersted discovers that an electric current creates a magnetic field, or Faraday that movement of a magnet 
induces an electric current.  Experiments explore; they do not just test hypotheses; they often initiate theory 
rather than following it. 
 The whole sequence of experiments on expert recall of chess positions is most fruitfully viewed as 
a series of problem-solving explorations that became increasingly interesting as new phenomena were 
revealed and ties disclosed to other important phenomena (e.g., verbal learning, Feigenbaum & Simon, 
1984; categorization, Gobet et al., 1997; architecture and capacities of STM and LTM, Gobet & Simon, 
1996; attention, Richman & Simon, 1989;  the nature of expertise, Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989).   
 Theories are more useful the stronger the constraints they place on the phenomena, yielding 
sharper and more quantitative predictions.  They are more useful if more general, provided that generality is 
not purchased at the cost of introducing free parameters and task-specific ad hoc conditions.  They are more 
useful and meaningful if they not only describe and predict products, but also explain them in terms of their 
processes.  In contrast to V-W's account, the line of research we have reviewed was not a series of isolated 
experiments, each pronounced a failure by significance tests, but a cumulative problem-solving search, in 
which early errors and insufficiencies led to new experiments, the discovery of new phenomena and 
improved theory.  
3.1. Product Theories and the Ecological Stance 
 Vicente and Wang had a very sound message, though one already well known to evolutionists and 
ecologists:  "To predict the shape of jello, look at the mold in which it is jelling."  An adaptive system is 
just that:  it adapts to its environment.  More explicitly:   
A thinking human being is an adaptive system; . . . . To the extent that [humans] are 
effectively adaptive, possessing the relevant knowledge and skills, their behavior will 
reflect characteristics largely of the outer environment (in the light of their goals) and will 
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reveal only a few limiting properties of their inner environments — of the physiological 
machinery that enables them to think (Simon, 1969, pp. 25-26).12  
  If we ignore a system's internal limits of adaptation, psychology becomes an impoverished 
science.  There are, first, the limits of knowledge, and second, the limits of memory capacity and speed of 
storing new information.  Dealing with these limits requires a theory of the organism, not just of the 
environment — that is, a process theory. 
  To make even the predictions it does about chess positions, CAH must assume: (1) that experts 
acquire information that facilitates description of a game position greatly, but description of a random 
position only slightly (a process assumption about learning);  (2) that, because of STM limits, "raw" 
perception alone cannot reproduce the board without pre-stored information (a process assumption);  (3) 
that intervening tasks do not always destroy the availability of this information (an assumption about 
memory architecture).  CAH claims that experts cope better than novices — because they have inherited 
and/or acquired what it takes to do that.  This claim doesn't tell us what  it takes, nor under what conditions 
or how the "what" was acquired.  These have to be supplied from outside the theory.   
 EPAM-TEMP theory replaces the required assumptions with integral components of the theory 
itself: that is, with mechanisms that satisfy these assumptions.  EPAM-TEMP, exposed to standard chess 
data bases, learns chunks and templates, thereby acquiring the predicted (and testable) knowledge structures 
that produce recall very close to that of human chess players at corresponding levels of skill.   
 
3.2. In Sum 
 The difference between CAH and theories like EPAM-TEMP is that the latter predict many 
phenomena that the former does not, and with fewer ad hoc assumptions, hence are stronger theories.13  
                                                 
12Revised to remove gender references. 
13The reader should not be misled by V-W's incomplete quotation of Richman et al. (1995, p. 327): "the 
range of tasks studied in detail is very limited to date."  What they said was, "But though the range of tasks 
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Further, recognizing that experimentation is exploration, the research sequence from de Groot in 1946 to 
today's experiments and models, illustrates how psychological knowledge advances by continuing mutual 
interaction of experiment with computer modeling and other theorizing.  
 This interaction between experiment and theory replaces the strategy, advocated by Popper (1959), 
of testing and refuting hypotheses with the much more productive strategy of gradually modifying and 
extending successful theories to improve their scope and accuracy.  In the present case, the advance 
involves areas of cognitive psychology, extending far beyond expertise in recall of chess boards into the 
whole range of cognitive psychology, anticipating V-W's vision (p. 49) of "cumulative theory of skill 
acquisition that can account for learning in a wide variety of tasks" (Anderson, 1983; Feigenbaum & Simon, 
1984; Newell, 1990).   
 V-W view CAH "as a stepping stone to developing viable process theories of expertise effects in 
memory recall. . . This role is valuable because it can make the search for a viable process theory more 
efficient than it has been" (p. 47).  This is a hollow claim when a process theory that incorporated the 
characteristics of the task domain as integral components long preceded CAH.  Product theories, 
incorporated in process theories to the benefit of both, are no new thing in this domain.   
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